Exposure of secret keys is a major concern when cryptographic protocols are implemented on weakly secure devices. Forward security is thus a way to mitigate damages when such an event occurs. In a forward-secure scheme, the public key is indeed fixed while the secret key is updated with a one-way process at regular time periods so that security of the scheme is ensured for any period prior to the exposure, since previous secret keys cannot be recovered from the corrupted one. Efficient constructions have been proposed for digital signatures or public-key encryption schemes, but none for non-interactive key exchange protocols, while the non-interactivity makes them quite vulnerable since the public information cannot evolve from an execution to another one.
Introduction

Non-Interactive Key Exchange
The famous interactive key exchange protocol introduced in 1976 in the seminal paper [DH76] by Diffie and Hellman can be turned into a simple and quite efficient non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) scheme: it enables two parties, who have first agreed on some parameters, to share a common secret without exchanging any additional messages but just their public keys. More precisely, the parameters simply consist of a group G of prime order p along with a generator g ∈ G. When Alice, whose secret/public keys pair is (x, X = g x ) for some x ∈ Z p , wants to share a secret with Bob, whose public key is Y = g y , she computes K = Y x , which value can be recovered by Bob by computing X y . However, eavesdroppers have no clue about this value, because of the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Hashing the resulting secret K along with both identities even leads to a provably secure scheme, according to the expected properties for a NIKE scheme, and this scheme is remarkably efficient. Indeed, both secret and public keys consist of one element and sharing a secret only requires one exponentiation from each user.
A first basic security model for NIKE has been provided by Bernstein [Ber06]. Thereafter, Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [CKS08] enhanced it, allowing dishonestly generated public keys. This models the real-life situation where public keys are published by users, without certification, or with a weak certification only (when the certification authority does not check the knowledge of the associated secret key, but just the identity of the owner of the public key). However, Freire et al [FHKP13] pointed out some weaknesses in their model such as the inability of the adversary to corrupt honest users, and thus get honestly generated secret keys or shared keys between two honest entities. They proposed the dishonestkey registration model, as the strongest security model, together with a scheme in a pairing-friendly setting, secure in the standard model.
Sakai, Oghishi and Kasahara [SOK00] proposed the first Identity-based NIKE (Id-NIKE) scheme, later formalized and proven secure by Dupont and Enge in an ad-hoc security model [DE06]. The above concerns about the Certification Authority, and dishonestly generated public keys, are irrelevant in the identitybased setting, however, again, the lack of oracle access to previous shared keys was noticed as a potential weakness by Paterson and Srinivasan [PS09]. They thus fixed the previous model and explored the relationships between Id-NIKE and Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). Moreover, they proposed constructions, using trapdoor discrete log groups, whose instantiations suffer from the high computational cost of the Extract algorithm (to get secret keys from identities), with security in the random oracle model. Recently, Freire et al [FHPS13] provided the first Id-NIKE and Hierarchical Id-NIKE schemes secure against corruptions in the standard model.
Forward Security
As for most of cryptographic protocols, the main threat against a NIKE scheme is exposure of users' secret keys since, contrarily to interactive key exchange protocols which can still provide some security in this case, all the session keys between the corrupted user and any other user get immediately leaked. Leakage of a secret key is therefore a major issue for all users, not only for the corrupted one. A classical solution to prevent leakage is to distribute the secret across multiple servers via secret sharing. However, this is not compatible with the goal of non-interactive key exchange which is to limit communications between the different parties. Anderson [And97] thus suggested forward security to mitigate damages caused by key exposure: the lifetime of a system is now divided into T time periods, the secret keys evolving with time. More precisely, at any time period i, each user owns a secret key sk i which he can use as usual, but also to derive his secret key sk i+1 , for the next time period. However, forward security requires that an adversary being able to recover sk i is unable to compromise the security of any previous time period: the evolving process from sk i to sk i+1 has to be one-way. In his talk, Anderson proposed a non trivial solution, but constructing protocols whose parameters were sub-linear in the number of
